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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the 
failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) 
negotiations which took place November 2003, the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known 
for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that 
uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as 
the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering 
political favors and goodwill through the financing of social 
development projects, ALBA has created a political 
environment whereby countries on the take and their 
respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing 
viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in 
economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the 
Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. 
To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides 
Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, 
Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among 
them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin 
American country, Syria.  
 
Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil 
wealth to pursue political capital.  Under the Chávez 
government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort 
countering the U.S.  Following Cuba‟s demise in the region 
as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is 
attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba 
left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a 
mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its 
own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once 
did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the 
international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, 
and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the 
region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. 
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Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez 
has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, 
funding several development projects. From stepping in to 
buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to 
helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, 
Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in 
the region. 
 
As in the past, Venezuela has invested   significantly both in 
time and money in the Caribbean, providing development 
assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are 
neither member nor observer states of ALBA.  The aid 
Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. 
It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM 
community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 
members, leading experts and leaders in the region to 
question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. 
 
Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on 
the Venezuelan economy.  Its success hinges on continued 
Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of 
Chávez to remain in power.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The means through which Venezuela is attempting to 
position itself as the leader of the anti-U.S. ideological 
agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean, ALBA, has 
exerted significant influence in the region.  Through the 
provision of considerable economic assistance to member 
and observer states, as well as other countries with ties to 
Caracas, ALBA serves as a centerpiece of Bolivarian 
Venezuela‟s foreign policy.  The political ramifications 
resulting from ALBA‟s aid could prove important in 
influencing the Western Hemisphere‟s political map as 
Venezuela‟s President Hugo Chávez continues his quest to 
achieve greater leadership.  However, the success of this 
quest hinges in large part on Chávez‟s hold on power in 
Venezuela, combined with the country‟s ability to sustain its 
economic capability.  
 
Currently comprised of eight member countries, ALBA has a 
GDP of over $630 billion USD, and a total population 
nearing 70 million as of April 2010. Working through this 
alliance, Venezuela has pledged billions of dollars in 
economic aid to countries such as Bolivia, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua and St. Kitts and 
Nevis, among others.  Ranging from the financing of a 
variety of social development projects, to preferential oil 
prices for a variety of Caribbean island nations, these various 
forms of assistance have enabled Venezuela to create an 
alliance of support towards its foreign policy positions, or at 
a minimum censor opposing viewpoints.   Perceived by some 
as “a vehicle for Venezuelan petro-diplomacy,” or a way for 
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Caracas to “advance its economic and political interests,” 
this „alliance‟ is both political and economic in nature.1   
 
With Cuba‟s guidance, Venezuela has used ALBA to 
establish itself in some aspects as the leader of the anti-U.S. 
movement in the region. 
 
VENEZUELA’S GEOPOLITICAL ASPIRATIONS 
 
For oil-rich Venezuela, the practice of obtaining political 
capital in exchange for economic assistance is not a new 
concept.  During the 1970s, Venezuela used its oil wealth to 
pursue a foreign policy agenda aimed at carving a leadership 
role in the region. Under President Carlos Andrés Perez 
(1974-79), it helped create OPEC, allowing it to “punch 
above its weight” after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, pivotal 
moments in its foreign policy history.
2
  Later, it went on to 
sign the San José Oil Pact, under which Venezuela and 
Mexico (also vying for influence in the region at the time) 
supplied oil at preferential prices to 11 Caribbean countries, 
as well as financing and technical expertise for infrastructure 
projects.
3
  The difference this time is that, rather than 
attempting to counterbalance Cuban influence as it did in the 
past, now Venezuela utilizes ALBA primarily as a political 
                                                 
1
 Christina DeFeo, “ALBA: How Much of a Turn to the Left in Latin 
American Governance and Economic Policy?” Council on Hemispheric 
Affairs Report, July 1, 2010.  
http://www.truth-out.org/alba-how-much-a-turn-left-latin-american-
governance-and-economic-policy60974. 
2
 Harold A. Trinkunas, “What is Really New about Venezuela‟s 
Bolivarian Foreign Policy?, Naval Postgraduate School Center on 
Contemporary Policy, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 2, February 
2006. 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2
006/Feb/trinkunasFeb06.html#references. 
3
 The San Jose Pact, also known as the San Jose Oil Facility Agreement, 
was an agreement signed on August 3, 1980 in San Jose, Costa Rica, that 
guaranteed Mexican and Venezuelan oil supplies under favorable 
arrangements to several Central American and Caribbean countries.  
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instrument that forms part of a concerted strategic effort to 
counter U.S. influence in the region.  
 
ALBA’S HISTORY AND STRUCTURE 
 
Anti-U.S. from its inception 
Since its founding, the organization‟s objectives have 
consistently aimed at countering U.S. policy in Latin 
America. ALBA, which means „dawn‟ in Spanish, was 
initially proposed in 2001 by Chávez as a regional 
alternative to U.S.-led free trade.
4
  Since the late 1990s, the 
U.S. had been trying to establish a regional free trade 
agreement with Latin American and Caribbean countries, 
known as the Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA). In 
2001, under Chávez‟s leadership and with Cuba‟s guidance, 
the ALBA was created as Latin America‟s answer to the 
FTAA.
5
  As years passed however, it became evident that 
while it was presented as an economic alliance, ALBA was 
indeed a vehicle to further Chávez‟s political agenda. 
 
Chávez and Cuba‟s Fidel Castro anchored this initiative, 
originally entering into an accord in December 2004 and 
committing to the exchange of medical/educational resources 
and oil between the two countries.
6
  Since its creation, 
ALBA‟s member and observer states, as well as other 
supporting states, have gathered for summits on a frequent 
basis. The 10
th
 and most recent summit took place in June 
(2010) in Ecuador, the previous nine have taken place in 
                                                 
4
 Alex Newman,  “Leftist Regimes Agree to New Currency,” The New 
American, October 20, 2009. 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/world-mainmenu-26/south-
america-mainmenu-37/2123-leftist-regimes-agree-to-new-currency.  
5
 James Roberts, “If the Real Simon Bolivar Met Hugo Chavez, He‟d See 
Red,” The Heritage Foundation, August 20, 2007.  
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/08/if-the-real-simoacuten-
boliacutevar-met-hugo-chaacutevez-hed-see-red. 
6
 Christina DeFeo, opp.cit. July 1, 2010.  
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Cuba and Venezuela, with the exception of the 7
th
 which also 
took place in Ecuador. 
 
Main Components 
ALBA is comprised of several components such as a 
proposed regional currency, a regional bank, and its own 
media outlet. Each component was established with an 
individual purpose, yet all sharing one thing in common:  
attempting to be an alternative to a U.S. led mechanism.  The 
SUCRE (Spanish acronym for Unified System for the 
Regional Compensation of Payments), the currency 
introduced by ALBA, aims to eventually operate as a hard 
currency, but currently does so only in virtual form for 
electronic transactions.
7
   
 
The Bank of ALBA, which claims to have over $1 billion in 
capital, makes loans available for states to undertake 
infrastructural, health, education, and social developments.  
Established in 2008, the Bank was deemed by Chávez as an 
alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank, describing it as “a political instrument for 
social and economic development which breaks with 
capitalist concepts.”8  Unlike the World Bank or the IMF, the 
Bank of ALBA does not impose loan conditions and 
functions based on consensus of all members, with a rotating 
presidency of the member nations.
9
  While its long-term 
success looms as a big question mark, the Bank of ALBA is 
yet another example of Venezuela‟s attempt to provide an 
                                                 
7
 Alex Newman, opp. cit. October 20, 2009.  
8
 Kiraz Janicke, “$1 billion for Bank of ALBA - Anti Capitalist 
Banking,” Venezuela Analysis, January 27, 2008. (Venezuelanalysis.com 
is an independent website produced by individuals who dedicated to 
disseminating news and analysis about the current political situation in 
Venezuela.) 
http://www.zimbio.com/President+Hugo+Chávez/articles/169/1+billion+
Bank+ALBA+Anti+Capitalist+Banking. 
9
 Ibid. 
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alternative international financial institution for its member 
and observer states.  
 
Venezuela also launched TeleSUR, a TV channel created in 
2005 which broadcasts throughout Latin America and the 
Caribbean. According to Chávez,  this  media  initiative aims  
at providing an alternative to what he calls a conspiracy by 
international and local commercial networks to silence and 
distort news from Latin America.
10
  With correspondents and 
news collaborators throughout the region, as well as in 
Washington, D.C., New York, London, and Spain, it 
broadcasts free of charge 24 hours a day via cable, satellite 
and Internet covering Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
U.S., Western Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.
11
   
 
In 2008, Chávez also suggested ALBA members "should set 
up a joint defense strategy, and integrate our armed forces 
and intelligence services because the enemy is the same: the 
United States empire."
12
  Despite little if no progress to this 
call, this does not seem to present a threat to U.S. hegemony 
in this area, but the idea could become a controversial issue 
if it ever became a requirement for a member state since 
levels of commitment to ALBA‟s vision vary. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Pascal Fletcher,"Chavez TV Channel Aims to be Latin American 
Voice,” Reuters, (Caracas, Venezuela: 12 April 12 2005). 
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_
all&address=102x1390772. 
11
 Hector Escalante Fuente, “TeleSUR celebra cinco años de transmisión 
informativa en Latinoamérica,” TeleSUR, July 24, 2010. 
 http://www.albatv.org/TeleSUR-celebra-cinco-anos-de.html. 
12
 Nikolas Kozloff, “Hugo Chávez's Anti-Imperialist Army,” Venezuela 
Analysis, February 19, 2008. (Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent 
website produced by individuals who dedicated to disseminating news 
and analysis about the current political situation in Venezuela.) 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3177. 
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Member Countries 
First launched with only two member countries, Cuba and 
Venezuela, today eight member countries comprise ALBA 
and all are signatories to its People‟s Trade Agreement.  
 
Bolivia, led by Evo Morales became the third member state 
in April 2006.  Daniel Ortega‟s Nicaragua joined in January 
2007; Dominica in January 2008; Ecuador in June 2009 once 
Rafael Correa became President; Antigua  and  Barbuda  and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also joined in June 2009, 
bringing its total members to eight.  Four other countries in 
the hemisphere are ALBA observer states, permitted to 
attend regional conferences and with plans to become full 
members in the future: Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay and 
Uruguay.
13
  Honduras had at one point intended to join while 
President Manuel Zelaya was still in power, but its Congress 
withdrew from doing so in January 2010, after he was 
ousted.
14
  
 
SPREADING ECONOMIC AID  
 
While Venezuela‟s main motivation for the creation of 
ALBA is mainly political and ideological, its leverage with 
the countries that participate in this alliance is its ability to 
provide economic assistance.  Many countries main 
motivation in being associated with ALBA is primarily 
driven by the economic benefits they can obtain from 
Venezuela.  Nevertheless, the global financial crisis which 
strongly impacted the Venezuela economy raises the 
question of whether Venezuela can eventually honor its 
much publicized pledges; that remains to be seen as part of 
                                                 
13
 Christina DeFeo, opp.cit. July 1, 2010.  
14
 James Suggett, “Honduras Withdraws from ALBA, El Salvador Won‟t 
Join Despite FMLN Support,” Venezuela Analysis, January 15, 2010. 
(Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent website produced by 
individuals who dedicated to disseminating news and analysis about the 
current political situation in Venezuela.)  
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5070. 
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its promised aid has been slow to materialize. Exact numbers 
on the funding and assistance that Venezuela has provided 
are difficult to find, however, press reports and other expert 
sources have provided some insight.  
 
Venezuela has come to the assistance of ALBA countries 
when in need.  For example, when the U.S. stopped buying 
Bolivia‟s soy beans in 2006, Cuba and Venezuela began 
importing them under ALBA.  ALBA has also assisted 
Bolivia upgrade its natural gas sector and Cuba has deployed 
doctors and teachers to Bolivia.
15
 Venezuela has also 
provided assistance to Bolivia‟s army, cattle ranches, 
microfinance projects and urban sanitation companies.
16
  
Nicaragua, since Daniel Ortega took control of the 
government again in 2007, has received an estimated $250 
million in aid from Venezuela in 2010 and about $125 
million during 2008 and 2009.
17
  In Ecuador, Venezuela is 
involved in a joint oil refinery construction project known as 
the Pacific Petrochemical Complex.
18
  ALBA, or Venezuela 
has also supported Paraguay, an observer state, whose 
leadership has maintained good relations with Caracas. With 
no proven petroleum reserves and a dependency on imports 
                                                 
15
 Larry Birns and Adrienne Nothnagel, “Cuba Comes in From the Cold,” 
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, July 31, 2006.  
 http://www.coha.org/cuba-comes-in-from-the-cold/. 
16
 Simon Romero, “Venezuela Rivals U.S. in aid to Bolivia,” New York 
Times, February 23, 2007.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/world/americas/23bolivia.html?_r=
3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print. 
17
  Victor Hugo Tinoco, “Corruption Is the Most Serious Aspect of The 
Ortega-Chávez Relationship,” Revista Envío, Number 338, September 
2009. (Revista Envío is a monthly magazine providing analysis on 
Central America, based out of Managua, Nicaragua.)  
http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/4061. 
18
 Steven Matther, Venezuela Pays for First ALBA Trade with Ecuadort 
in New Regional Currency,” Venezuela Analysis, July 7, 2010. 
(Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent website produced by 
individuals who dedicated to disseminating news and analysis about the 
current political situation in Venezuela.)  
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5480. 
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for domestic oil consumption, Paraguay received Chávez‟s 
pledge of millions of dollars in aid and needed  professionals 
to help it explore reserves.
19
  Uruguay, an observer state, has 
also received considerable economic assistance through 
ALBA.  In addition to receiving an estimated 40,000 
barrels/day of oil at discounted prices, it has also obtained  
financing to expand an existing refinery and the needed 
crude oil to run it.
20
 
 
Focus on the Caribbean 
As it has done historically, Venezuela continues to look to 
the Caribbean as its strategic area of influence. In spite of the 
U.S. being the main economic partner in the region and 
maintaining good political relations, Venezuela offers an 
alternative source of economic assistance.  Through ALBA, 
Venezuela supplies oil to St. Kitts and Nevis, Haiti, and the 
Dominican Republic at discounted prices; Haiti is only an 
observer state and neither the Dominican Republic nor St. 
Kitts and Nevis are member or observer states of ALBA, yet 
are permitted to pay their oil bills to Venezuela in barter for 
agricultural products, such as bananas or sugar.
21
  For 
Dominica, Venezuela has offered to modernize its 
international airport, granting it $8.7 million USD and 
providing an additional $80 million USD to build an oil 
refinery, and the required crude oil to run it.  Venezuela has 
                                                 
19
 Stratfor, “Venezuela: The price of Paraguay” (18 August 2008).  
http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/122287/analysis/venezuela_prize_
paraguay. 
20
 Associated Press, “Uruguay's new leader strengthens ties with 
Chavez,” (Caracas, Venezuela: 7 April 2010).  
 http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Uruguays-new-leader-apf-
1773004816.html?x=0&.v=1 
21
 Shawn Hattingh, “ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to Neo-
liberalism,” Venezuela Analysis, February 13, 2008.  
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3154. 
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also granted Dominica an additional $4.4 million USD to 
support its agricultural sector.
22
  In Antigua and Barbuda, it  
committed $8 million for the financing of a water 
infrastructure project, and for the reduction of pensioners‟ 
utilities and educational scholarships.
23
  For St. Vincent and  
the Grenadines, it has pledged a $50 million low interest 
loan.
24
 
 
Leadership also entails coming to the aide of countries 
during natural disasters. To that end, Venezuela has also 
positioned itself as a donor country. In the wake of Haiti‟s 
devastating earthquake, Venezuela pledged $2.4 billion to 
relief efforts, more than the U.S. ($1.2 billion), the European 
Union ($1.7 billion) and the World Bank ($399 million), and 
was the first to respond, landing a military plane loaded with 
food and Haitian medical students.
25
 Additionally, it forgave 
 Haiti‟s $395 million foreign debt owed to Venezuela under 
a subsidized fuel program.
26
   
 
Aid May Cause Possible Rifts in CARICOM  
The economic assistance provided by Venezuela to various 
Caribbean nations may be causing rifts within CARICOM.  
Chávez is inviting support from Caribbean countries with 
strong economic ties to the US through subsidized oil and 
                                                 
22
  Latin America Monitor, Dominica Joins ALBA, February 2008. 
http://www.latinamericamonitor.com/file/52318/dominica-joins-
alba.html. 
23
 Stabroek News, “Antigua formalizes ALBA participation,” 
(Georgetown, Guyana: 28 June 2009)  
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2009/news/stories/06/28/antigua-
formalizes-alba-participation/. 
24
 Karl Eklund, “Gonzalves on ALBA,” St Vincent and the Grenadines 
Blogspot, April 13, 2010.  
http://svgblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/gonsalves-on-alba.html. 
25
  Jim Wyss, “Venezuela major donor of assistance to Haiti,” The Miami 
Herald, July 5, 2010.  
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/05/1716791/venezuela-major-
donor-of-assistance.html. 
26
 Ibid.  
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aid that may in some cases surpass assistance offered by the 
U.S.
27
 While it can be argued that Venezuela has fallen short 
in bringing all CARICOM nations under the ALBA umbrella  
(six of the 15 CARICOM states have forged closer ties with 
Venezuela),  some regional leaders like Jamaica‟s Prime 
Minister Bruce Golding have questioned whether 
CARICOM will continue behaving as a bloc in the 
international arena, pointing out that ALBA‟s political 
implications can cause a rift within the CARICOM 
community.
28
  He stated that perhaps the involvement of 
CARICOM states in ALBA is nothing more than the pursuit 
of “opportunities for individual short-term economic benefits 
even if the pursuit of these opportunities diverges from the 
commitment to joint CARICOM policies and actions.”29 
Although ideology may not be at its center, the economy is. 
Given Venezuela‟s history of engagement in the Caribbean 
and ALBA‟s political agenda, the question remains whether 
in pursuing these opportunities during tough economic times, 
CARICOM as a bloc might be weakened to the point of 
endangerment.  
 
York College Professor, Ivelaw Griffith, denotes the issue of 
sustainability.  Continued economic support for the region 
hinges on Chávez's remaining in power and the health of 
Venezuela‟s economy, which is not as strong as it once was.  
He also sees a potential rift in CARICOM with regard to 
territorial disputes, particularly noting the one between 
Guyana and Venezuela. Although Guyana has historically 
counted on full CARICOM support on this issue in 
                                                 
27
 Brian Ellsworth, opp. cit.  2 September 2008.   
28
  Antigua Observer, “UNDESIRED CONSEQUENCES: Golding says 
CARICOM under threat,” (Kingston, Jamaica: 10 June 2009). 
http://www.antiguaobserver.com/?p=1336. 
29
 Antillean, “CARICOM disjointed again, this time over ALBA,” 
(Barbados: 27 April 2009).  
http://www.antillean.org/2009/04/27/caricom-disjointed-again-this-time-
over-alba/. 
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theinternational arena, Dr. Griffith argues it remains to be 
seen when  the  issue  surfaces  again  whether  positions will 
shift given Venezuela‟s influence on ALBA-associated 
Caribbean nations. Finally, he points out that despite 
Venezuela‟s outpouring of aid to the Caribbean, the fact 
remains the U.S. is more of a direct foreign investor in the 
region, particularly in areas related to trade and tourism. 
However, as Sir Ronald Sanders, former Caribbean 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom and the World Trade 
Organization, underscores, “since  the  end  of  the  Cold 
War, U.S. official development assistance to CARICOM 
countries has dwindled and has focused more on issues of 
concern to the U.S. such as the interdiction of drug 
traffickers; port and airport security as part of the U.S. war 
on terror; and illegal migration.” 30  In effect, the U.S.‟s 
diminishing assistance may lead the island-nations to closer 
relations with ALBA members. 
 
 MECHANISM FOR PROMOTING FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Stepping into Cuba’s Foreign Policy Shoes 
The proactive involvement in regional hemispheric issues by 
Venezuela during this past decade has made Chávez a 
reference to the anti-American socialist camp in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. His new role in the foreign 
policy arena is an attempt by Venezuela to assume the 
leadership exerted by Cuba in the region for approximately 
three decades, starting in the 1960‟s, and take over where it 
left off over 10 years ago. The ideology remains consistent, 
based on a strong anti-U.S., anti-imperialism tone. In fact, it 
can be argued ALBA resembles OSPAAL (Organization of 
Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America), a mechanism used by Cuba to coordinate 
liberation movements around the world united by their anti-
U.S. agenda. Cuba lost its resources when the Soviet Union 
disintegrated in 1991, but preserved the blueprint which it 
                                                 
30
 Sir Ronald Sanders, opp.cit. April 17, 2007. 
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has re-used in acting as a key advisor to the government in 
Caracas. The ideological approach is consistent, but the 
difference  is  that  Venezuela  relies  on  its  own  resources,  
rather than those of a superpower patron. Thus, Venezuela 
seeks to coalesce a regional foreign policy through economic 
assistance, traditionally a role of the U.S., Europe or the 
former Soviet Union. 
 
Led by Venezuela, ALBA countries have begun to exert 
themselves as a voting bloc in the OAS where debates on the  
hemispheric political situation are played out. Having 
recently issued a joint country statement where it told the 
OAS to stay out of Venezuela‟s affairs, ALBA has not been 
shy to flex the muscle it has built with its member and 
observer states, as well as other non-member supporting 
states.
31
 This has provided Chávez with an alliance capable 
of challenging U.S. positions, while simultaneously moving 
its own policies forward in that international body. 
Additionally, the ALBA alliance represents a solid voting 
bloc in the Latin American and Caribbean group at the UN, 
which can potentially vote for Chávez‟s policies in that 
body.
32
   
 
Urge to act on the world stage 
While the core of Venezuela‟s foreign policy deals primarily 
with Latin American affairs, Chávez has shown his urge to 
be a player on the world stage. A vocal advocate of positions 
contrary to the U.S., through ALBA, Chávez has recognized 
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the 
former Soviet Republic of Georgia; managed to obtain 
enough votes to block the final binding agreement on the 
                                                 
31
 BBC Caribbean News Service, “ALBA tells OAS to stay out of 
Venezuela‟s internal affairs,” (Caracas, Venezuela: 21 February 2011) 
http://rjrnewsonline.com/news/regional/alba-tells-oas-stay-out-
venezuelas-internal-affairs 
32
 Danielle de Bruin, “The Chavez ALBA Initiative is the dawn of 
trouble for the Americas,” The Henry Jackson Society, June 13, 2008. 
http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=688 
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Copenhagen Accord in 2009; and has been a strong 
supporter of Iran‟s nuclear ambitions. These are examples of 
Venezuela‟s debut on issues of a more global nature. 
 
Chávez has also extended ALBA observer state status to a 
country outside the Americas, listed on the State Sponsors of 
Terrorism list.  During an official October (2010) two-day 
visit to Syria to bolster bilateral relations, an agreement was 
reached to  build a refinery with a 140,000 oil barrel capacity 
in that country, with the joint investment of Iran and 
Malaysia.
33
 Following the trip, Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad and Chávez signed an act of integration for Syria to 
become an observing nation of ALBA.
34
  Clearly not a 
country geographically situated in ALBA‟s realm, this move 
is an example of Chávez‟s desire to forge closer ties with 
countries traditionally on opposing sides from the U.S.   
 
CONCLUSION  
 
From its creation, ALBA has functioned as a political 
vehicle through which Venezuela has taken the baton from 
Cuba as the anti-U.S. ideology-driven leader in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The political ramifications of 
this regional alliance have already been noted by leaders and 
experts in the region alike, who have suggested Venezuela is 
attempting to influence the Western Hemisphere‟s political 
map. To that end, Chávez has used ALBA as an economic 
tool for political ends that oppose U.S. interests in the region.  
 
Some experts believe ALBA has not brought many tangible 
political benefits to Chávez.
35
 Nonetheless, as part of his 
                                                 
39 
Anna Mahjar-Barducci, “Venezuela and Syria: "The Caracas-
Damascus Axis",” The Hudson New York, November 29, 2010. 
 http://americas-forum.com/content/venezuela-and-syria-caracas-
damascus-axis. 
 
40
 Ibid.  
35
 James Roberts, opp.cit. August 20, 2007. 
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regional strategy to provide billions in aid, Chávez‟s 
particular   attention  to  CARICOM  nations,  has  put  these  
 
states in a position where they may find themselves at odds 
in the near future with their sister-states in key foreign policy 
positions.  The question remains whether Venezuela will 
continue to rise as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the 
region and beyond. Critics argue ALBA‟s future does not 
appear to be sustainable. “Venezuela faces one of the highest 
inflation rates in the world, alongside recurring food 
shortages,   infrastructure  problems,   housing shortages, and  
increased crime and corruption,” argues Jodie Neary.36 
Additionally, it has accumulated $20 billion in debt to China 
alone.
37
 Because of its close link to the Venezuelan 
economy, the very success of ALBA is dependent on 
continued oil sales at stable prices and Chávez ability to stay 
in power.  
 
Having forged an alliance among countries rich in energy 
resources (oil and hydrocarbons), metals and agricultural 
land, ALBA has the potential to weigh-in on debates taking 
place in multilateral settings related to Latin American 
affairs. Venezuela offers “generous handouts in its foreign 
policy, peppered with a pro-poor, distributionist discourse.”38 
However, Chávez‟s use of “social spending to create or 
promote political clones abroad, not just a diplomatic shield 
                                                 
36
 Jodie Neary, “Venezuela's ALBA in the face of the Global Economic 
Crisis,” Upside Down World, December 29, 2008 
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuela-archives-35/1642-
venezuelas-alba-in-the-face-of-the-global-economic-crisis-. 
37
 Corina Rodriguez Pons and Daniel Cancel, “Venezuela Depleted 
Savings Amid Oil Revenue Plunge,” Bloomberg Businessweek, April 29, 
2010.  http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-29/venezuela-
depleted-savings-amid-oil-revenue-plunge-update1-.html. 
38Javier Corrales, “Venezuela‟s Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: 
Current Trends,” Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, July 17, 2008. 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/cor071708.pdf. 
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abroad, causes him to suffer diplomatic setbacks.”39 Because 
he often promises more than he delivers, he disappoints 
many of the politicians he is trying to court. Despite this,  
 
Venezuela has not only picked up where Cuba left off over 
10 years ago, but has perhaps already gone a few steps 
further in its quest.  
 
ALBA‟s use of social policy as a primary foreign policy tool 
has in fact brought Venezuela some rewards, allowing 
Chávez to win two types of allies: states that refuse to 
criticize him, and intellectuals on the left, especially in 
Europe.
40
  As Professor Javier Corrales argues, “Chávez‟s 
social power foreign policy has produced for Venezuela an 
impressive shield against international criticism even by 
those who know better, and a reputation for humanitarianism 
among those who are less informed. This is a significant 
foreign policy accomplishment.”41 Yet, many questions 
remain unanswered as to the long-term viability of ALBA, 
its ability to recruit more countries, and its role in continuing 
to further Venezuela‟s foreign policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
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40
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